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Abstract
In this article I outline an original form of ethical theory that I call exemplarist virtue theory. The 
theory is intended to serve the philosophical purposes of a comprehensive moral theory, but 
it is also intended to serve the practical purpose of moral education by structuring the theory 
around a motivating emotion – the emotion of admiration. In this theory, basic moral concepts 
are defined via direct reference to exemplars of moral goodness, picked out through reflective 
admiration. The theory gives narratives a critical function, and it connects empirical studies with 
the a priori side of ethics.
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1. Introduction
For most of philosophical history, moral philosophers have not done a very good job of 
creating theories that serve philosophical purposes, but which can also be used to make 
people moral. Narratives are useful for the purposes of moral education and improve-
ment because they engage our motives much more than abstract theories, and narratives 
are crucial to shaping our vision of a good life, but it is hard to see how narratives can be 
woven into a theoretical framework. Modern life makes another demand on us that is 
very difficult to satisfy: we need to find a public moral discourse that allows us to talk 
across cultures, but which is sensitive to the beliefs of individual communities, including 
faith communities. In addition, a number of philosophers have argued recently that moral 
philosophy should integrate empirical work, or at least it should be responsive to such 
work. My position is that even though a significant part of moral theorizing is a priori, it 
is an advantage of a theory if it has a natural relation to empirical studies.
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I have been working on a form of virtue theory that I call exemplarist virtue theory.1 
The theory has four aims:
1. to serve the philosophical purpose of producing a comprehensive ethical theory,
2. to serve the practical purpose of moral education by structuring the theory around 
a motivating emotion,
3. to link the a priori side of ethics with empirical research in psychology and 
neuroscience,
4. to contribute to the perennial effort to find a moral discourse that has thinner ver-
sions for cross-cultural discourse, as well as thicker versions for use within par-
ticular communities.
Given the topic of this symposium, I will pay particular attention to the first two aims. The 
idea is that there is a way to construct an abstract moral theory that is adequate for purely 
theoretical purposes, but which contains within the structure of the theory a moral motiva-
tor: the emotion of admiration. The foundation of the theory is something that attracts a 
person to moral improvement, and which permits a variety of forms for communities that 
arise out of different moral traditions. So my answer to the question ‘Can morality be 
taught?’ will be affirmative, but my focus will be on a way of conceptualizing the connec-
tion between moral theory and moral learning that makes the theoretical side of ethics 
derivative from a part of our nature that drives us to be moral. Because I will be proposing 
a theory that contains something non-conceptual as an intrinsic part, I will need to start by 
presenting my theory of theory – what I think a theory is supposed to do.
2. My theory of moral theory
I think of a moral theory as an abstract structure that aims to simplify, systematize, and 
justify our moral beliefs and practices. Creating theories is part of the practice of moral-
ity. Since one of the aims of a moral theory is to simplify, it will leave out many subtleties 
and complexities in the practice of morality. There is nothing wrong with that as long as 
we are not under the illusion that the features of moral practice left out of the theory 
disappear. We are simply not attending to them when we are engaged in theory building 
and discussion. They will reappear when we engage in some other part of the practice. 
But we would not construct theories unless we thought that there is something to be 
gained by simplifying. Given the limitations of the human mind, we are not able to 
understand a domain taken as a whole unless we ignore part of the domain we want to 
understand. The bigger and more complex the domain, the more we have to leave out if 
we want to understand it. Morality is an enormous domain that involves almost every 
aspect of human life and, to some extent, non-human life. It is not surprising that we can-
not get our minds around it without mentally stripping away much of interest in the 
practice of morality.
I think this is a general point about understanding that applies even to the understand-
ing of something as simple as the layout of a city. If every feature of the city was on the 
city map, the map would be as complex in its layout as the city is, and the map would not 
help us understand it. So the map leaves out many things, and it may also distort some 
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things, such as the shape and relative size of Canada or Russia on a two-dimensional map. 
The map can be misleading, but a two-dimensional map is often more useful than a globe, 
even with the distortion. The distortion does no harm as long as we are aware of it.
Similarly, it is more useful to conceptualize moral reality without certain things in it, 
but it is helpful to keep in mind that we made a choice to leave those things out and the 
result might be a distortion. For instance, most moral theorists believe that a good moral 
theory leaves out the identities of the persons in the practice. The reason is that we get 
impartiality in our way of understanding morality if we do not mention who is who. 
Since I am going to make the unusual move of proposing a kind of moral theory that 
identifies certain individuals, I think it is worth thinking about the fact that we usually 
make the choice to leave out the identities of persons in a moral theory, and the choice is 
made for a reason. But as long as we are aware of the reason for the choice, we might 
decide that it is not always an advantage to make that choice.
I think it is important that a moral theory is not primarily a manual for decision-
making, and it is not constructed to be a manual. Again, a moral theory can be compared 
to a map. A detailed street map will help us get around a city, but many maps do not have 
a practical purpose. When we look at maps in books about foreign countries, or when we 
see maps of battlefields on television or in a book of history, our aim is not to get any-
where. A map of the world is not detailed enough to help us get from place to place, and 
it is not intended to do so. I think of a comprehensive moral theory as like a map of the 
world. Theories of parts of morality are closer to street maps. A theory of just war, or a 
theory of friendship, or a theory of duties to future generations, is closer to a street map. 
But I think that even a street map is not constructed with the sole purpose of guiding a 
person from place to place. If your primary purpose was to get from one point in a city 
to another, you might not use a map at all. A GPS navigation system might be a more 
efficient tool for getting around. But a navigation system cannot give you the under-
standing of the layout of the city that you get from a map. Similarly, if our main purpose 
was to get guidance in moral decision-making, we would want a manual, not a theory.2 
But the manual would not give us understanding of the domain of morality as a whole.
I think, then, that moral theory aims primarily at explaining and justifying moral 
beliefs and practices, and only secondarily at telling us what to do in any given situa-
tion. There are many elements in our moral practices that pre-exist theory and which we 
seek to understand. These include reactive emotions such as admiration, praise, blame, 
remorse, indignation, and horror; practices of punishment; rules such as the Golden 
Rule or the Ten Commandments; and values such as freedom, fulfillment, and social 
cohesiveness. Some of these elements are reflected in narratives that are cherished by a 
community and passed down from generation to generation. Of course, there are many 
other elements of our moral practices that pre-exist theory. My point is that a moral 
theory is about something that already exists, and we seek to understand it through a 
moral theory.
What we seek to understand can be altered by the process of seeking to understand it. 
In this respect a moral theory is unlike the map of a city. I suppose we can imagine a map 
that we liked so much that when the map and the layout of the streets did not coincide, 
we changed the streets, not the map. But assuming that we do not want to move the 
streets around, the point of a map is to give us understanding of the physical layout of a 
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city that is already there and that will change for reasons that have nothing to do with the 
map. Moral theory is different because even though there are moral practices that are 
already there in advance of the creation of theory, since one of the purposes of the theory 
is to justify the practices, we might find out that some element of the practice is not easily 
justified if it is related to other elements of the practice as given in the map. That could 
lead us to change the practice in response to the theory. In contrast, a city map does not 
seek to justify the layout of a city, only to depict it.
I have said that a theory is not a manual, but it is an advantage if a theory can connect 
to central features of our moral practices in a plausible way. It is particularly advanta-
geous if it can link up with narratives since narratives are the primary vehicle for the 
moral education of the young, and the primary way humans of any age develop and alter 
their moral sensibilities. Narratives capture the imagination, and elicit emotions that 
motivate action. It might seem impossible that a theory can include an emotion – not the 
concept of an emotion, but an emotion itself, but that is what I am going to propose. The 
motivating element is contained in the theory.
Given my theory of theory, it is not clear whether moral theories are in competition 
with one another. Presumably, some theories are better than others, but it is not obvious 
that there cannot be two equally good theories that are dramatically different. Most of us 
would strongly hesitate to allow the possibility of two equally good moral manuals that 
give conflicting moral directions. But as I’ve said, a theory is not the same as a manual, 
and I am leaving open the possibility that there can be more than one equally good moral 
theory. If a theory aims to be comprehensive, it would be naive to think that it will not be 
compared with other theories that aim to be comprehensive, but if we return to the map 
analogy, I think we can see that, since maps always leave something out, good maps can 
leave out different things. A topographical map often leaves out roads and political bor-
ders, whereas maps that indicate roads and borders typically lack indications of elevation 
and elevation contours. A map that has both is not necessarily a better map because too 
much information can be confusing. The map may be hard to read. But when a map is 
designed to get you somewhere, multiple maps should get you to the same place. That is 
why different moral theories yield mostly the same moral verdicts about particular cases. 
When they do not, we know that one of them is defective.
3. Features of a good moral theory
From what I have said in the last section, we can expand the list of features of a good 
moral theory from which we began:
1. A moral theory should simplify and systematize our pre-theoretical moral beliefs 
and practices, aiming at giving us understanding of the practices of morality, and 
sometimes resulting in a revision of those practices. This may lead to some dis-
tortion, but that can be tolerated if something is gained from the distortion and the 
distortion is not forgotten.
Although a moral theory may leave out some things, I think there are some very 
general concepts that ought to have a place in the theory. These concepts are a good life, 
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a good state of affairs, a virtue, and a right act or a duty. I do not mean to insist that 
every good moral theory must have a place for every concept. For instance, Elizabeth 
Anscombe (1958) remarked over a half century ago that Aristotle’s ethical theory shows 
that it is possible to have a comprehensive theory without the concept of duty. But I 
mention this series of concepts because they play an important role in modern moral 
discourse, and the way moral theorists relate them reveals deep differences in the ways 
they understand moral practice. Usually one concept is fundamental and the others are 
defined by reference to the fundamental concept. For instance, Aristotle makes eudai-
monia, or a good life, basic, with virtue defined in terms of a good life, and a right act 
defined in terms of what a virtuous person does. Kant makes a right act, in the strong 
sense of duty, basic. A virtue is defined in terms of the will to do one’s duty. Mill makes 
a good state of affairs basic and defines a right act as an act that leads to a good state of 
affairs. The way a theory relates these concepts indicates their importance to the theo-
rist. For instance, virtue gets no attention in Mill and, until recently, only a small amount 
of attention in contemporary forms of consequentialism. Plato and Aristotle talk about 
virtuous acts, but give little attention to a right act and arguably none at all to duty. So I 
am trying to illustrate both a difference in patterns of understanding these fundamental 
moral concepts, and the difference in the importance these concepts have in the respec-
tive theories. There are things that one theory considers important that another theory 
leaves out entirely or mentions only in passing. My purpose in making this remark is to 
point out that anybody constructing a moral theory ought to be aware of what is left out, 
and to do so only for good reason. That gives us another feature that we want in a good 
moral theory:
2. A moral theory should be as comprehensive as possible, compatible with simplic-
ity. That should include giving a way to connect the concept of a good life, the 
concept of a good state of affairs, the concept of a virtue, and concepts of the 
moral properties of acts such as a right act, a virtuous act, and a duty.
I said that a moral theory is not a manual. It primarily aims at understanding, not 
directions for acting. But if a theory can give us directions while satisfying the other 
desiderata in a moral theory, so much the better. But to do that, there has to be some way 
that a user of the theory can connect the theory to what the theory is about. When we are 
using a city map, it is only helpful if we can find something in the city that hooks it to the 
map – that intersection over there is this one on the map. A stationary map will some-
times have a mark that says ‘You are here’ in order to orient the user. It seems to me that 
a moral theory needs something that serves that purpose – something that tells us that this 
element of moral belief or practice is that element in the theory. Unlike a map of an 
imaginary city, a moral theory is like a map of an actual city, and a user needs to connect 
the map with actual moral practice in order to negotiate the practice. I suggest, then, a 
third feature of a good moral theory:
3. A moral theory needs a hook to connect it to the domain of moral practices of 
which it is a theory. Just as a city map is useless unless we can identify something 
on the map by reference to something in our experience, a moral theory is useless 
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unless we can find a place where the theory connects to a part of the moral domain 
we can identify independent of the theory.
Finally, I want to turn to the problem with which I began this article. Very few moral 
theories have any connection with moral motivation. To the extent that they succeed at 
being abstract structures that explain our moral practices, they fail at motivating us to 
properly engage in moral practices. Moral theory is a map, but you will not get to the 
destination if you do not want to use the map. The problem is not that the theory does not 
have sufficient detail. The problem is that it is not the sort of thing that makes you want 
to get to the destination, no matter how much detail is added. If I am right that the pri-
mary function of a moral theory is to map the domain of morality, it does not count 
against a theory if it does not motivate. But, given that a moral theory justifies our moral 
practices by providing reasons for adopting certain courses of action and attempting to 
have certain character traits, there ought to be a connection between the moral reasons 
given by the theory and what actually motivates us. Otherwise, moral theory is like a 
map that tells us how to get to the destination we have, but we rarely use it for that pur-
pose. The map might still be explanatory in some sense, but it does not explain what we 
actually do and why we do it. I suggest, then a fourth feature of a good moral theory:
4. Ideally, a moral theory can be used to actually motivate people to be moral, and 
to lead to moral improvement.
4. Exemplarism
A stumbling block to any moral theory is the justification of the starting point. The theory I 
want to propose is foundational in structure, and although a foundational structure has 
advantages of simplicity and elegance, it is particularly vulnerable to skepticism about the 
proposed foundation. It is no accident that neo-Aristotelian theories that start from the con-
cept of happiness or well-being generate more discussion about the vagueness of the foun-
dation and the difficulty in justifying it than about the very rich and interesting derivative 
parts of the theory. The same point applies to the Kantian idea of the good will and social 
contract theories. I am not objecting to any of these theories, but when a theory begins with 
something that requires that important substantive issues have already been decided, it is 
bound to raise lots of questions before the theory gets going. I want to make the foundation 
of my theory a state that most people trust – their emotion of admiration. It is foundational-
ist, but the foundation is not conceptual. Instead, the construction of the theory begins with 
direct reference to exemplars of moral goodness, picked out by the emotion of admiration. 
My model for the foundational move in constructing a theory of this kind is the influential 
theory of direct reference, which was developed by Hilary Putnam (1975) and Saul Kripke 
(1980) in the 1970s, and which produced a revolution in semantics.
Leaving aside differences in different versions of the theory, the basic idea is that a 
natural kind term like ‘water’ or ‘gold’ or ‘human’ refers to whatever is the same kind 
of thing or stuff as some indexically identified instance. For example, gold is, roughly, 
whatever is the same element as that, water is whatever is the same liquid as that, a 
human is whatever is a member of the same species as that, and so on, where in each 
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case the demonstrative term ‘that’ refers directly – in the simplest case, by pointing. 
One of the main reasons for proposing this account of reference was that Kripke and 
Putnam believed that often we do not know the nature of the referent, and yet we know 
how to construct a definition that links up with its nature. We may not know the nature 
of gold – its deep structure – and for millennia nobody did, but that did not prevent 
people from defining ‘gold’ in a way that fixed the reference of the term and continued 
to do so after it was discovered what distinguishes gold from other elements. In fact, we 
would not say that modern humans ‘discovered’ the nature of gold unless we thought 
that modern speakers know the nature of the same stuff of which people used to be 
ignorant. The theory of direct reference explains how ‘gold’ referred to the same thing 
before and after the discovery of the atomic structure of gold, and hence how we can say 
that nobody knew what makes gold ‘gold’ until the modern era.
One of the exciting features of this proposal was that it meant that competent speakers 
of the language can use certain kinds of terms to successfully refer to the right things 
without going through a descriptive meaning. Compare a term like ‘hammer’. When you 
say ‘hammer’, you refer to whatever satisfies a description given in advance. Presumably 
you cannot talk about hammers unless you grasp that description. In contrast, speakers 
need not associate descriptions with terms like ‘water’ and ‘gold’ in order to successfully 
refer to the right kinds. In fact, they can succeed in referring to water and gold even when 
they associate the wrong descriptions with terms like ‘water’ and ‘gold’. It is not even 
necessary that every speaker be able to identify water and gold reliably themselves as 
long as some speakers in the community can do so and the other speakers rely upon the 
judgment of the experts.3
An interesting consequence of the theory of direct reference is that there are necessary 
truths discovered empirically. Kripke thought that once the reference of a natural kind 
term like ‘water’ is fixed by ostension, scientists then discovered the nature of water by 
observation. Under the assumption that the molecular structure of water is essential to it, 
it follows that certain necessary truths such as ‘Water is H2O’ are discovered a posteriori.
This idea can be used in the construction of a moral theory. I suggest that basic moral 
concepts are anchored in exemplars of moral goodness, direct reference to which are 
foundational in the theory. Good persons are persons like that, just as gold is stuff like 
that. Picking out exemplars can fix the reference of the term ‘good person’ without the 
use of descriptive concepts. It is not necessary for ordinary people engaged in moral 
practice to know the nature of good persons – what makes them good. In fact, it is not 
necessary that anybody knows what makes a good person good in order to successfully 
refer to good persons, any more than it was necessary that anybody knew what makes 
water ‘water’ to successfully refer to water before the advent of molecular theory. We 
need not associate any descriptive meaning with ‘good persons’, and users of our lan-
guage can successfully refer to good persons even when they associate the wrong 
descriptions with the term ‘good person’. As with natural kinds like gold and water, 
people can succeed in referring to good persons as long as they, or some people in their 
community, can pick out exemplars.
Practices of picking out such persons are already embedded in our moral practices. 
We learn through narratives of fictional and non-fictional persons that some people are 
admirable and worth imitating, and the identification of these persons is one of the 
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pre-theoretical aspects of our moral practices that theory must explain. Moral learning, 
like most other forms of learning, is principally done by imitation. Exemplars are those 
persons who are most imitable, and they are most imitable because they are most admi-
rable. We identify admirable persons by the emotion of admiration, and that emotion is 
subject to education through the example of the emotional reactions of other persons. I 
am proposing, then, that the process of creating a highly abstract structure to simplify 
and justify our moral practices is rooted in one of the most important features of the pre-
theoretical practices we want to explain, the practice of identifying exemplars, and in a 
kind of experience that most of us trust very much – the experience of admiration, shaped 
by narratives that are part of a common tradition.
This theory is compatible with the view that our identification of exemplars is revis-
able. Just as we can be mistaken in our judgment that some portion of water we identify 
is really water, we can also be mistaken in our judgment that some person we identify as 
paradigmatically good is really good. However, I don’t think that we could be mistaken 
about most exemplars for the same reason that we cannot be mistaken that most of what 
we take to be water is water. That is because there is a referential connection between 
good persons and the individuals we identify as good – good persons are persons like 
that, and the parallel point holds for water.4
One of the most interesting features of the Kripkean account of natural kinds is the 
way empirical investigation can reveal natures, and I think this also is a feature of exem-
plarist virtue theory. If the concepts in a formal ethical theory are rooted in a person, then 
narratives and descriptions of that person are morally revealing. It is an open question 
what it is about the person that makes him or her good. For the same reason, when we say 
that a good person is a person like that, and we directly refer to St Francis of Assisi, or to 
Confucius, or to Jesus Christ, we are implicitly leaving open the question of which prop-
erties of Francis, Confucius, or Christ are essential to their goodness. The exemplarist 
approach has the advantage that substantive matters about what makes a person good 
need not be settled at the outset. We need not start by assuming that certain traits are the 
virtues or that certain acts are right. But we do think in advance of observation that what 
makes a good person good is their psychological structure, just as we think in advance of 
observation that what makes water ‘water’ is its molecular structure. Observation tells us 
what the psychological structure of a person is, just as observation tells us what the 
molecular structure of water is. If we also think that being H2O is an essential property 
of water, we might also think that having certain properties – e.g. compassion, justice, 
and wisdom – are essential to being a good person. I think, then, that Kripke is right that 
deep and important, perhaps even necessary, properties of the object class can be deter-
mined by empirical observation, although the determination of what counts as deep and 
important is not itself empirical. Since narratives are a form of detailed observations of 
persons, exemplarism gives narrative a crucial place within the theory analogous to sci-
entific investigation in the theory of natural kinds. I am leaving open the possibility that 
narratives even reveal necessary features of value by uncovering the deep properties of a 
good person. If so, there would be necessary a posteriori truths in ethics that can be dis-
covered in a way that parallels the discovery of the nature of water.
Perhaps we will find out that exemplars do not have a common deep psychological 
structure. Perhaps it will turn out that ‘good person’ is not like a natural kind term, 
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referring to something that has an essential nature. Maybe there is nothing interesting 
and important that the Dalai Lama, Jesus Christ, Confucius, the Stoic sage, and the Greek 
heroes have in common. I do not want to prejudge the results of close observation of 
exemplars. After all, it could have turned out that the stuff in the lakes and streams and 
falling from the sky when it rains does not all have a common chemical structure. So 
‘good person’ might turn out to be more like ‘tasty drink’ than like ‘water’. A more plau-
sible outcome is that ‘good person’ is multiply realizable.5 There is not a single essence 
of good personhood, but there is a set of interesting, yet different, ways in which a person 
can be good. It is also possible that the set of exemplars gradually changes over time. 
After a moral revolution such as the revolution in attitudes towards persons of different 
races or ethnic backgrounds, some, but by no means all, features of the persons we rec-
ognize as exemplars changed. I am suggesting that these are all testable hypotheses.
If we can identify virtuous exemplars, empirical research may reveal interesting fea-
tures of their attitudes and behavior. I know of at least three topics of recent empirical 
research that directly bear on the theory I am proposing. First, there is a small but grow-
ing body of research in neuroscience on the features of exemplars (e.g. Van Slyke et al., 
2012; Walker and Henning 2004). There is also relevant research on mimesis or imitation 
(e.g. Garrels, 2006; Herdt, 2008: Ch. 1; Iacoboni, 2008). Third, there is research on 
admiration, or what Jonathan Haidt calls “elevation” (e.g. Algoe and Haidt, 2009; 
Viancello et al., 2010). It would be very interesting to connect these pieces of empirical 
work, and find out whether there is empirical validation of a connection between the 
emotion of admiration and imitation, as I am suggesting here, and how the identification 
of exemplars by other methods connects with the identification of exemplars through the 
emotion of admiration. I know of work on L’Arche caregivers, and the neuroscience of 
exceptional persons as they play economics games.6 There are many other potential 
empirical studies on exemplars that would be useful for identifying their moral traits and 
behavior dispositions. The theory I am proposing shows how empirical research of this 
kind, as well as narratives about exemplars, can be integrated into an abstract structure 
that I believe illuminates the moral life.
Let me review. What I mean by an exemplar is a paradigmatically good person. An 
exemplar is a person who is most admirable. We identify the admirable by the emotion 
of admiration. I do not assume that we always trust our emotion of admiration, and the 
emotion is shaped by the emotional responses of others, but when our emotion survives 
reflection and we trust it, we take the object of admiration to be admirable. A person who 
is admirable in some respect is imitable in that respect. The feeling of admiration is a 
kind of attraction that carries the impetus to imitate with it. This is rough because there 
are many reasons why we do not or cannot imitate those we admire. For instance, I 
admire Robert Falcon Scott, who made an expedition to the South Pole in 1912 under 
very arduous circumstances, resulting in the death of the entire party, but I have no incli-
nation to go to the South Pole myself, even if I was assured I would not die. But there is 
a way in which my admiration does make me want to imitate Scott – not in any particular 
way, but in wanting to be the kind of person who could do such a thing. So I do think that 
the urge to imitate is included in admiration.7 The function of admiration is very impor-
tant in the theory I am proposing because the ways in which exemplars are admirable, 
and hence imitable, can be used to give us both a way of understanding significant moral 
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concepts and a way of using those concepts to make ourselves and our lives conform to 
the admirable.
My view of a moral theory is that it is an abstract structure, and I said that, to be com-
prehensive, it should include definitions of all the most important moral concepts. So far 
I have proposed that the theory begin with direct reference to paradigmatically good 
persons, picked out through the emotion of admiration. I suggest that basic moral con-
cepts be defined roughly as follows:
A virtue is a trait we admire in an admirable person. It is a trait that makes the person 
paradigmatically good in a certain respect.
A right act in some set of circumstances C is what the admirable person would take to 
be most favored by the balance of reasons in circumstances C.
A good outcome is a state of affairs at which admirable persons aim.
A good life (a desirable life, a life of well-being) is a life desired by admirable 
persons.
In each case, the definiendum is defined via indexical reference to a paradigmatically 
good person. So a virtue is a trait we admire in that person and in persons like that. A 
good state of affairs is a state of affairs at which persons like that aim. A good life is a life 
desired by persons like that. A right act is an act a person like that would take to be 
favored by the balance of reasons.
Notice that these definitions are not intended to reveal the ‘deep’ nature of virtue, 
right action, or a good life. They are like defining water as stuff like that, where the deter-
mination of the deep nature of water is left for investigation. The purpose of the defini-
tion is to identify the reference of the term to make investigation of it possible. Similarly, 
the purpose of the definitions I have given is to permit us to identify the reference of 
moral terms in such a way that we know what to investigate to find out what virtue, right 
action, and a good life are.
Aristotle uses a definition similar to this pattern in the Nicomachean Ethics when he 
defines virtue as a mean between extremes ‘as a person with practical wisdom (phrone-
sis) would determine it’ (1106b35). A well-known objection to this style of definition for 
right action is that what is right for the exemplar might be wrong for me because my 
defects change what is right for me to do. For instance, if I followed the exemplar’s 
course of action, that might lead to serious temptation for me, but not for the exemplar. 
Or the exemplar’s behavior might not be right for me because it is too difficult for me to 
do. I should aspire to something within my reach. Furthermore, there might not be such 
a thing as what the exemplar would do in circumstances like mine because the exemplar 
would never be in circumstances like mine. I might be in a fix that no exemplar would 
get into. For example, maybe I made conflicting promises, then lied to avoid keeping one 
of the promises, then discovered that if I try to keep the other promise, I must lie again, 
and so my misdeeds are spiraling out of control and sinking me into further wrongdoing. 
What should I do in such a situation? It cannot be what the exemplar would do because 
the exemplar would not be in such a situation.
I think that we can answer this objection by taking another hint from Aristotle. 
Although Aristotle defines virtue as a mean between extremes, the determination of 
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which is given by the phronimos, he says that a person with a vice should aim for the 
opposite vice. A cowardly person should aim for foolhardiness, an intemperate person 
should aim for insensibility, and so on. I am sure we can think of ways this advice would 
not always work, but the important point here is that moral improvement may come in 
stages, and direct imitation of the exemplar may come only after a person has reached a 
certain level of moral development. Before that, the person does better at imitating per-
sons who are better than he is, but not so much better that he cannot see clearly the path 
to becoming like the exemplar.
The problem of imitating a person too much better than oneself illustrates another 
feature of the relationship between virtue and right action: the importance of focusing 
first on acquiring the traits of the exemplars (the virtues), and secondarily on the behav-
ior of the exemplars as models for one’s own behavior. An act performed by a foolish 
person may differ in its moral value from the same act performed by a wise person. We 
do better by aiming to imitate the character of exemplars, both because their specific acts 
may be inappropriate for us, and because we cannot fully succeed in creating moral value 
through our acts without virtuous motives, understanding of the meaning of our acts, and 
knowledge of their consequences. I should first try to become a person like that, and then 
I will be on a firmer ground when I imitate their acts.
5. Advantages of exemplarist virtue theory
Exemplarist virtue theory has a number of desirable features in a theory:
1. It is simple, comprehensive, and I think it gives us understanding of the moral 
life, although that is for others to judge.
2. It has a hook connecting the theoretical structure of the theory with the actual 
practice of the moral life. As I mentioned, we cannot use a street map unless we 
can tell where we are by observation, which permits us to say that that intersec-
tion is this place on the map. Similarly, our experience of admirable persons 
permits us to say a virtue is a trait of this person, the right thing to do is what this 
person says it is, and so on. Our experience of admirable persons provides the 
hook that ties our theoretical moral discussions with our experience.
3. Since the foundational move in the theory is not conceptual, controversial sub-
stantive issues about the virtues, the nature of a good life, and the catalogue of 
right and wrong acts do not have to be decided in advance. Since the theory 
makes these issues a matter for observation of admirable persons, it can be used 
both to justify and to test our moral judgments.
4. The theory can be used for the practical purpose of moral improvement as well as 
the theoretical purposes of a theory because the theoretical structure is built upon 
a motivating emotion. If I am right about the psychology of admiration, admira-
tion is the link between the desire to be moral and a conceptual network of moral 
concepts. Admiration is elicited through personal experience and narratives. This 
gives it another advantage:
5. Narratives have a place within the structure of the theory analogous to scientific 
observation in the Putnam/Kripke theory of natural kinds. Narratives are the 
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primary vehicle through which moral education is accomplished, but it has 
always been difficult to connect narratives with a theoretical structure. For 
instance, Christian ethics is supposed to be focused on the imitation of Christ, but 
there is rarely any attempt at a connection between the person described in the 
Gospels and systematic moral theology. My approach can be used to make the 
imitation of Christ the foundation of a comprehensive moral theory that serves 
the purposes of a philosophical theory, but which integrates into the theory 
Gospel narratives, lives of the saints, and reflections on the experience of admi-
rable Christians. What I am providing is the structure; what Gospel narratives and 
other Christian stories provide is the substance.
I know of one case in which the exemplarist structure I have proposed may already 
exist in a full ethical theory. My colleague Amy Olberding argues in her book on the 
ethics of Confucius (2011) that this theory offers the key to interpreting the ethics of 
the Analects. Confucius treats the Duke of Zhou as an exemplar, and Confucius’ stu-
dents treat him as an exemplar. In both cases, the ideas of a good human trait and the 
proper way to behave are determined by reference to the exemplar. Olberding’s book 
interprets the text in detail using this theoretical structure. I am not professionally 
qualified to say whether Confucian ethics is exemplarist, but I find it heartening that 
the exemplarist framework offers possibilities of interpretation that have not previ-
ously been noticed.
6. The theory connects with empirical studies, and suggests new avenues of cross-
disciplinary research on admiration, the features of exemplars, and the place of 
imitation in moral learning. It might seem that persons cannot be investigated 
scientifically the way water was investigated in the seventeenth century, but the 
neuroscience of virtuous exemplars is already underway, and it may yield inter-
esting results that are not noticed in ordinary human observation and narratives. 
The theory may also lead to new empirical studies on the identification of exem-
plars and the connection between the emotion of admiration and emulation of 
admired persons.
7. The theory provides a framework for cross-cultural dialogue on morality. It per-
mits us to identify both cross-cultural similarities and cross-cultural differences 
in moral beliefs by linking the traits a group of people call virtuous, the acts they 
call right, and the lives they think are most worth living to the people they admire 
as exemplars. People can usually understand why the exemplars of a different 
culture or religious community are admirable. So the Western Christian can 
admire Confucius, non-Christians admire St Francis, and people who otherwise 
have very different ideas of a good life may admire secular saints like Martin 
Luther King Jr. But people outside a community also often notice features they 
think are missing or underdeveloped in the exemplar, and the differences can be 
as important as the similarities because they give us a way to engage in cross-
cultural critique. I am suggesting a vocabulary for cross-cultural discourse that 
focuses our attention on the objects of admiration. The objects differ in some 
ways, but the emotion itself is universal.
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Earlier, when I gave my theory of moral theory, I said that I think there can be more 
than one good moral theory. My aim here has not been to critique other theories, but 
since exemplarist virtue theory provides a link between moral education and the theoreti-
cal side of ethics, it has particular importance for the interests of this symposium.
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Notes
1. I described a theory of this kind for the purposes of Christian moral theology in Zagzebski 
(2004). The general form of the theory is outlined in Zagzebski (2010), and this article is 
based on that one. I am currently working on a book on exemplarist virtue theory that devel-
ops the theory for the purposes I am describing here.
2. What I have in mind here is the sort of manual that Catholic priests used to use for the purpose 
of counseling sinners in Confession. They included a large catalogue of sins, classified under 
general moral principles. But priests were trained to understand the moral theology under-
writing the manual.
3. In Kripke’s initial version of the theory, a natural kind term refers to something that is caus-
ally linked to an historical dubbing. This theory was plausible as a theory of the reference of 
proper names. I am not using this causal theory of reference in what follows.
4. As Putnam famously argued in his example of water and Twin Earth, if the Twin Earthians 
point to XYZ when they say ‘water’, while we Earthians point to H2O, we are not disagreeing 
about the nature of water. We mean something different by ‘water’ than they do. Similarly, I 
would say that if one group of people routinely points to people who are brutal, greedy, and 
envious when they say ‘good person’, whereas others point to people who are compassion-
ate, generous, and sympathetic, their disagreement is more radical than a disagreement about 
which traits are good traits. They disagree about what ‘good’ means.
5. I thank Catherine Elgin for this suggestion.
6. These are ongoing studies conducted by the research team of Michael Spezio, Gregory 
Peterson, Warren Brown, James Van Slyke, and Kevin Reimer, editors of Van Slyke et al. 
(2012). They discuss their work on L’Arche caregivers in Reimer et al. (2012).
7. David Velleman (2007: 523) has proposed that admiration leads to emulation by motivating 
wishful picturing of oneself in the image of the admired person. There are other models of the 
connection between admiration and emulation or imitation. I am not endorsing a particular 
model.
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